The Right of Return

The question of the Palestinian Right of Return is big and crucial. But the discussion is predicated on factors and notions which do not really help the debate or a solution. This issue needs to be looked at, to some extent separately, in two different ways: the first concerns deep emotional-historical issues and principles, which are being discussed, and the second concerns planning, sustainability and real-life viability issues, which largely are obscured.

Emotional-historical issues are rooted in a number of big assumptions. First up is the notion that most or all refugees are likely to return. Yet, once the principles of justice are sorted out (compensation, residency rights in other countries and other practicalities), how many Palestinian exiles, and their descendants, are likely to see return as a real-life advantage economically and in terms of their life-prospects and those of their families? It is neither safe nor realistic to assume that return will actually be advantageous for large numbers, with or without the presence of conflict or today's conditions in Palestine or Israel.

Second comes the well-hardened assumption that Palestinians and Israelis cannot trust one another and will always have a conflict of interest - with or without security walls, checkpoints and current restrictions. Yet many outsiders are correct to observe that the potential for symbiosis between Palestinians and Israelis is significant, and their mirroring of each other in so many details does not automatically imply conflict - equally, in time, it can imply complementarity and mutual advantage.

Third come two major under-discussed issues. These are, first, environmental sustainability - possibly, in the coming fifty years, a bigger issue than the existing context of conflict itself. Israel and Palestine are very built-up and urbanised, with serious water-supply, space and toxicity issues, and the convenient forgetting of this, between two peoples who assert that they love their land so much, does not get rid of the massive minefield that is yet to be identified and cleared. This clearance can be done only through collaboration. Water-flows, species propagation and climatic variables don't recognise security walls, green lines or classes of people.

Then there's that thorny question of national boundaries and sovereign states, established less than a century ago by, amongst others, my own country, Britain. Lost in arguments over one-state or two-state solutions, we lose sight of a bigger eventual possibility, a no-state solution - some sort of Middle Eastern union.

Before rejecting this possibility, please remember that one model, the European Union, was founded to bind previously warring states into a system where conflict would be eliminated. This has succeeded (nowadays we just shuffle feet and bicker, but we don't fight, and we haven't lost our national identities). Crucial ingredients were the free movement of people and resources, free trade and investment and collective, continental-scale legislation.

The EU is by no means ideal, but it is far better than what my father's generation once had. In his twenties he lived and fought under the belief that 'the only good German is a dead German', while in his seventies his favourite car became the Volkswagen. In his nineties he wishes well toward Germans. Things change, bigtime, over the decades, especially when they look as if they never will.

The scenario of a regional union cannot be ruled out in the debate on return and a 'final settlement', and it might even be the only viable option. This also embraces the possible return of Jews to Baghdad, Alexandria and Tehran, the freeing of nomadic Bedouin to follow their goats wherever they roam, and the freedom of Christians and Druze to spread around as they will. It embraces the fact that, before the West interfered, the ethnic groups of the Middle East defined their identities not territorially but through their social roles, while territorially they were substantially integrated and interrelated. It was Western border-drawing interference that laid the foundation for the current tragedy.

There is a big challenge here. The challenge is to inform the argument on right of return with genuine research into and storyboarding of the genuine issues, factors and full range of options before us. It is necessary to free up the argument and suspend old assumptions and fixities.

One is the Israeli assumption that they cannot trust and make friends with their neighbours, who will always have the stated or covert intention of eliminating them. It's time to revise and re-proportion this assumption, with generations in mind - generations who care more about their kids than what their parents thought.

Another assumption is that Palestinians are narrowly and solely Palestinian, when historically they are interrelated with people across the Middle East and elsewhere - today, as exiles, they are substantially internationalised, like Jews. This means we need to separate the emotional principle of return from its possible demographic realities because, in the fullness of time, it's the demography that matters.

In the next fifty years, and in the context of enormous global-scale change from which Israelis and Palestinians are not exempted, only a proportion of Palestinians will choose to return - arguably 10-50%. Of these, some will make a complete move, while others will prefer the right to visit, invest or take up partial residence (like many Israelis in Israel).

Some Palestinians and Israelis will leave too - in Britain, we have sizeable immigration but also significant emigration, especially since we are reasonably free to do so. Those who do not return are due some sort of just settlement, concerning compensation for past losses and guarantees of full rights in those countries where they now reside. The highest priority here, especially in terms of resource limitations, is not the principle of restitution, important though this is, but the restoration of full and proper life-chances for all of those who are disadvantaged and trapped in their situation. Equal rights.

Then there is viability and sustainability, economic and ecological - the big unmentioned factor. Israel has prospered in the past on subsidy from USA and international Jews, and from military and political muscle and international acquiescence, but this is not reliable in future. Many Israeli settlements are environmentally unsustainable, and they suffer many of the ills of new towns elsewhere - domestic breakdown and violence, health and psychological problems, employment and facilities problems, and others. The problem of settlements could be self-adjusting in the long term.

Many Palestinian towns are infrastructurally creaky and, while Palestinians are right to hope for better than they now have, it is important to remember Martin Bell's pertinent statement from his book Through Gates of Fire, 2003: "Peace and freedom can be defined as the peace that makes traffic jams possible and the freedom to be stuck in them".

It is not safe for Palestinians to assume that all will be well whenever peace and a final settlement comes, that the economy will thrive and that returning to Palestine will be viable and advantageous to everyone. It will be advantageous to some, and this depends greatly on the style of development Palestinians choose, and the very real limitations in terms of water, space and practicalities that are present in 'historic Palestine'.

Since the resource-hungry Western lifestyle is now under threat, Israelis might be forced to choose between a reduction of living standards or residency in Israel - with or without Palestinian return. And Palestinians might have to develop a greater equity, clean-up and collaboration between themselves than even Hamas talks about.

So, to carry out this debate properly, serious research and investigation of a variety of scenarios is necessary, without the corrupting influence of current prejudice, assumption and predication. For peace to work, all people of all kinds need to feel they are receiving an acceptable deal - and this will involve sacrifices and hidden benefits for all parties. Nothing is going to be easy and no one will get their own way.

Collaboration, normalisation, the opening of borders, the establishment of appropriate development and large-scale ecological efforts will bring many benefits but, to get there, the whole narrative needs to change. So an inventorising of resources, limitations and potentials needs to be done, based on significant future possibilities embracing climate change, political and technological developments and, not least, a variety of social-psychological variables. A seat-of-the-pants approach could work too, but part of this 'contract' involves the willingness to encounter and deal well with decisive, unavoidable crises.

It could be that Israeli population is outsized by Palestinian population, or even that the Israeli population declines - but is this truly a mortal threat to Israelis? It could be that many or few Palestinians actually choose to return, with a variety of possible consequences, but we cannot assume that most or all Palestinians shall do so or make a successful realistic transition.

It could be that, by dint of disease, toxicity or resource shortage, Palestine and Israel become less attractive. Alternatively, that with an arrival of peace and normalisation, living conditions could improve - this won't mean golf-courses and endless road-building, but it could mean a society which becomes something socially very attractive, even if materially relatively lean and economical.

We do not know until the spectrum of options is properly visualised and researched. We cannot know unless movement toward the future is permitted, unlocked from the fixed mess it now is in. We cannot know until evolving circumstances worldwide are permitted to evolve further. But we can clarify the terms of the debate and the argument by proportioning it to likely realistic scenarios and suspending fears and anticipations based on an obsolete 20th Century agenda.

Continuing along the current trajectory does no one any good, and it could be that, in future, the costs and consequences for Israelis and Palestinians rise steeply, not from threat and conflict - the old picture - but from failure to adapt to the new picture - enormously changing world circumstances.

Why I sympathise with Israelis

People often think I'm pro-Palestinian. But I'm pro-people. It's just that, of the people of the Holy Land, those I can be most of service to at present are Palestinians. This could change.

I sympathise greatly with Israelis. I'm speaking from an historian's longterm perspective. The momentum is running out of Israel's development, as it has been to date, and I think a difficult time of truth is coming for Israelis. This arises from certain very factual issues which cannot now be ignored or avoided. The Israeli tendency is to stave things off long enough to make them go away, but I don't think these will go away.

It's a collection of issues.

First, aliyah, the return or immigration of Jews to Israel, has ground to a virtual halt. This is partially because Israel has not turned out as safe as Jews initially sought, way back in the shadow of WW2. Also, Jews in other countries seem to feel happy enough where they are, and significant numbers no longer need to come - all those who felt the need have moved to Israel. This means that the expansion of Israel is stopping, and in fact it might have overextended itself - as evidenced by the need to build a wall around itself to protect itself. Not just this, but people are leaving - often to get jobs or just 'get a life', or after doing military service. They're not decisively emigrating, but they're going until things get decidedly better. This means loss of people.

Second, Israelis are a disparate and argumentative lot, and it's difficult for many foreigners to figure out how these people stick together as a nation. Israelis are very nationalistic but, beyond that, for every two Israelis there are three fervent opinions, and national unity is a troublesome factor. This question tends to be suppressed by having the threat of the Palestinians on the doorstep and in Israelis' midst. It unites the people and creates a state of ongoing truce and solidarity between Israelis - and with international Jews. But this is a parlous situation: what happens if there is to be peace? It is even arguable that powerful elements in Israeli society want to keep conflict going for this reason - though it is true that the majority of Israelis are conflict-weary and seek some sort of peace and security. And peace is inevitable sometime - conflict cannot be kept going forever.

Third, Israelis pay an enormous price for conflict and insecurity. This is psychological, becoming multi-generational, and it is factual too - in terms of the social effects of militarisation, the claustrophobic nature of many settlements, rising domestic and civil violence across society, harm to the economy (such as the collapse of tourism, loss of international popularity, taxation and poverty) and many other factors. This price cannot be borne indefinitely.

Fourth, USA is now Israel's only supporter and, during the second intifada (1999-2004), Israel lost much favour. USA's capacity and willingness to continue supporting Israel politically, militarily and financially is not indefinite and everlasting, and Israel depends on it highly unless something is to change. What lies behind this is a need for Israel to fully acknowledge its position in the Middle East. This means making friends with its neighbours - not only for security, but for economic, environmental and social-cultural reasons. This is inevitable, not only because Israel's neighbours constitute a majority. It's because time moves on, and new and different things need to happen.

Fifth, it's those Palestinians. Despite losing their conflict with the Israelis, the Palestinians have two quite factual advantages over Israelis. One is their high birth rate, which means that, whatever their status, they are becoming a majority of the joint population of the Holy Land (Israel and the Occupied or Palestinian Territories). Democracy or not, a majority still counts in the fullness of time. The second is that, despite their misery, their society is in a funny way healthier than Israeli society. It is as if they have been so thoroughly beaten for so long that something has changed in them - they experience what British people call 'World War Two Spirit'. This is a mixed blessing, a tragic happiness, but it represents a social and community wealth which many richer and more favoured countries, Israel amongst them, do not have. In other words, despite the proclivity of the young men in Gaza to squabble and fight when worked up, there is more togetherness and humanness in Palestinian society than you'd expect. They're dirt poor in one sense and rich in another - while developed countries are rich materially and poor socially. Israelis know little of this, because they are walled off from it by a physical and psychological apartheid and many of them don't even meet Palestinians or see their living areas.

There are more issues too. One is environmental: Israel is a toxic mess, and Palestine too - and Palestine's shortages render it into a health and pollution risk for Israel, since Palestinians are not in a position to attend to environmental and public health issues. There is a massive water resource problem for both countries.

Another is the wider world, where things are moving on from the past, and the world is accelerating into a globalised, regionalised situation, to an extent leaving Israel behind - since its preoccupation with its own situation makes Israel a strangely insular country. USA is large enough to kid itself it can be isolationist, but Israel is small, with restricted travel outside. Dutch can go to Germany for a party or football match, but Israelis cannot drop in on Damascus for shopping and restaurants.

So, all in all, the outlook doesn't look rosy. The course the nation of Israel has followed since its founding nearly sixty years ago is changing. Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky spoke for their day. This 'whither next?' threshold is deeply threatening to some, and welcome to others. Israel was a land of hope and promise, and things have gone strangely sour. As an immigrant land, the nation must have a clear sense of purpose to survive, and it is faced with finding a new one - and currently reluctant to do so. This change will happen, but it's a matter of how easy or painful it is to be.

This is scary. In a way, it is more scary than the threat of Palestinians or Arabs. It involves building a new consensus amongst Jews based not on the Holocaust but on the future. Historically, Jews have had a legitimate fear of persecution and annihilation, but in the 21st Century they are in a position to make peace with the world and end this cycle. Because, in our day, longterm prejudices toward Jews are outweighed by feelings deriving from Israel's current and recent behaviour. If this changed, and if Israel became a more compliant and cooperative nation in the world order, much of what Jews experience as anti-Semitism would dwindle, and in a generation or two it would be mostly forgotten. Because too much else is going on in the world, and arguments of the past are becoming irrelevant. Given time to cool down, Arabs and Palestinians are willing to accept Israel: they just need certain crucial things to be worked out with it. In the Middle East, different peoples have lived together for many millennia - it's the region's natural condition.

This faces Israelis with themselves. The Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, the seculars and religious, the settlers and 'Israel proper', the different nationalities, the many different tribes and interest groups who jostle together in that small space called Israel. They need to clarify whether they wish to live in a state reserved for Jews, or a multinational state with a significant Palestinian, Bedouin, Druze and foreign population. They need to build an incremental peace with their neighbours. And this is difficult for them right now.

Palestinians have another advantage over Israelis. They have already seen the worst and adjusted to it. Israelis haven't - and this makes things more difficult for them internally. Palestinians sure do have a lot to work out too, but it's not really as fundamental as the questions Israelis are yet to face. (I'll write on this another time).

In the last election, the Israeli vote divided to create a very undecided situation. The current government is running on a post-Sharon momentum, which is a new version of an old approach. But this is not about a national sense of purpose, or a regeneration of Israel. So the question of Israeli identity, purpose and true priorities is left pending for another day.

There is a truth-process approaching for the wider world. Its impact on the developed world and the West is bigger than most would care to think. It concerns wealth and power in the world. And Israel, being a developed country, is part of that question. The West is losing its dominance in world affairs - its time is passing. Something different is happening.

The agenda for Palestinians is relatively simple: they just want a better life. This is a relatively unified goal - how to get there is what divides them. For Israelis, there is much more soul-searching and reorientation ahead - over coming years and decades. For they have a bitter-sweet life, and mixed feelings around it. Israel and its people will ultimately gain a lot from soul-searching - and some Israelis already know the shape it needs to take. It is simply the building of a safe, fertile, peaceful, happy land of Israel. One which is not surrounded by walls and fences, but which openly plays its unique and focal part in a wider Middle East and world. For Israel is a special little country, with a unique offering. And it cannot do without its neighbours and surrounding environment.

And the rest of the world has its own soul-searching to do too.

Bizarrely, to outsiders, Arabs and Israelis complement each other down to details. They are, according to their own beliefs, both children of Abraham - they're family. If they weren't, perhaps the argument would have been resolved by now. Imagine a time when Jews are a distinct grouping within a larger Middle East, in which the different peoples of the region define themselves as before, for millennia, not so much by territory but by social niche and role. Remember, through much of history, one of the greatest centres for Jews was Sumer, Babylon and then Baghdad, and Jews have played a prominent contributory role in many parts of the Middle East - in Damascus and Cairo and from Spain to Central Asia. As well as, today, in Europe, America and elsewhere. The future has a place for Jews. And everybody. By necessity.

But it requires an act of trust, and a getting-real. And this is easier when it's behind you than in front of you.